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1. Introduction 
In 2003, Shanghai Jiaotong University published the first Academic Ranking of 
World Universities (ARWU). Another league table, the THES-QS World University 
Rankings, was published a year later by Times Higher Education and Quacquarelli Symonds, 
followed by many other similar endeavours subsequently.
1 Not surprisingly, American 
universities dominate all these world university league tables. Why the US ‘monopolizes’ the 
world’s top universities is an intriguing question. 
The objective of this study is to identify the key socioeconomic factors that determine 
countries’ performance in world university league tables. In doing so, we aim to shed light on 
the question posed in the title of the paper. The answer to this question has important policy 
implications. If the US’s dominance in the league tables is more than just a result of its 
economic hegemony, then there is a great need to understand the factors at the micro or 
institutional level that are driving the success of its universities as it would provide valuable 
learning opportunities to other lagging countries in improving their university education 
systems. For example, Aghion et al. (2009) analyse how university governance affects 
research output at European and U.S. universities, after realising U.S. universities are obvious 
positive outliers in ranking performances. Also, in 2008, the University of Melbourne 
restructured its academic programs entirely based on a hybrid of the US university and 
European Bologna models, while all other Australian universities are watching as bystanders 
with both interest and reservation. 
The ranking on league tables increasingly have real resource implications for 
universities. This is because, despite the criticisms of their accuracy, reliability and 
usefulness, university rankings have been quickly adopted as a quality assurance mechanism 
around the world. In particular, international students use league tables to help identify top 
                                                 
1 The Melbourne Institute has been ranking Australian universities (Williams & Dyke 2004; Williams 2007), 
and U.S. News & World Report published its first World’s Best Colleges and Universities rankings in 2008 
using the THE-QS data, after publishing America’s Best Colleges and America’s Best Graduate Schools for 25 
years. 3 
 
universities (Hazelkorn 2008). Research commissioned by the Higher Education Funding 
Council of England indicates that league tables are already influencing international 
recruitment, although more so in some markets than in others (HEFCE 2008). In Qatar, 
scholarships for study abroad are limited to students going to highly ranked institutions as 
identified by the ARWU and THES-QS rankings (Salmi & Saroyan 2007). Given this, it is 
not surprising that many institutions have already used their ranking positions for marketing 
purposes. Some institutions have even established a formal internal mechanism for reviewing 
their rank and the majority of them have initiated actions in order to improve their 
international ranking (Hazelkorn 2007; Healy 2009). 
The importance of university league tables goes beyond the interests of prospective 
students and university administrators. Education has become increasingly an export item. 
For example, for Australia, which is one of the major players in international education, 
education constitutes the third largest export item, contributing US$10,230 million to its total 
exports in the year 2007-08 (DFAT 2008). Furthermore, as universities are a key place for 
conducting frontier research and a place for higher education, poor performance in league 
tables may indicate constraints on future development and growth.
2  
Due to the aforementioned factors, university rankings seem to be influencing policy 
makers and possibly the classification of institutions and the allocation of funding (Hazelkorn 
2007). Authorities in many countries have already responded to the international competition 
in higher education. In 2005, Malaysia’s opposition called for a Royal commission of inquiry 
in response to a fall of a hundred places of its top two universities in the THES-QS ranking 
(Salmi & Saroyan 2007).
3 In April 2008, the French Minister for Higher Education and 
Research outlined that one of her priorities is to reinforce quality assurance of higher 
                                                 
2 A large body of literature has found important positive effects of education on economic growth and 
development, e.g. Barro (1991), Schofer et al. (2000) and Koop et al (2000). 
3 See section 3 for a critic of the volatile nature of THES-QS rankings. 4 
 
education, which will entail a thorough analysis of international quality indicators, as well as 
the impact of global rankings. 
A common feature across different league tables is that the distribution of the world’s 
top universities is highly skewed toward a single country—the US. According to the most 
widely cited league table, ARWU, in 2008 the US has 17 top 20 universities identified in the 
table, 54 top 100, 90 top 200, 114 top 300, 139 top 400, and 159 top 500.
4 In comparison, 
China, though having a much larger higher education sector
5, has only 18 top 500 
universities, 7 top 400, 6 top 300, but none in the top 200. Since university rankings in these 
league tables are determined by the statistical indicators underpinning the ranking score, such 
as the number of journal publications and the number of Nobel laureates, the ‘reason’ that the 
US is well ahead of other countries in the league tables is simply that its universities have 
published many more journal articles, recruited many more Nobel laureates and so forth. 
Simply put, the league tables indicate that the US has more of a specific type of human 
capital—academic talent—than other countries. Therefore, in trying to identify the key 
socioeconomic factors that determine countries’ performance in university league tables, we 
are essentially seeking for the socioeconomic explanation of cross country differences in 
academic talent stocks. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no such quantitative analysis in the literature. 
Aghion et al (2009) use the ARWU league tables to measure university output in their 
examination of the effect of university governance. The focus of their analysis is on the 
institutional level, not on the macroeconomic level. Also, they focus on the comparison 
between the performances of European and US universities only. Marginson (2007) attempts 
to look at this issue; however, he only compares countries’ share of top universities with their 
                                                 
4 Different league tables indicate the dominance of US universities to a different degree. For instance, the 
THES-QS ranking noticeably puts more UK and Australian universities in top spots than the ARWU does. 
However, the overall picture is largely the same. 
5 According to the UNESCO, in 2006, 5.6 million tertiary students graduated in China, as compared to 2.6 
million in the US. 5 
 
share of economic capacities measured by total GDP multiplied by GDP per capita. By using 
such simple summary statistics, the study does not control for other factors or noise in the 
data. More importantly, by considering only those countries that successfully enter the league 
tables, it confronts selection bias problems. In the current paper, we use regression methods 
to address these problems. 
  This paper is inspired by a number of quantitative analyses of Olympic medal tally 
results, including Bernard & Busse (2004), Johnson & Ali (2004) and Morton (2002). 
However, our modelling technique is different in the way that we employ count data models 
instead of the standard OLS regression or the Tobit model used by these studies. We 
demonstrate that the Poisson model provides a better modelling approach in the current 
context. Furthermore, as against the Olympic Games literature, endogeneity is potentially a 
much bigger problem in the current study. This is because, to the extent that a country’s 
performance in university league tables is a proxy for its research capability, the causality 
from rankings to income cannot be ignored. Endogeneity is tested as part of the empirical 
analysis. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodology, 
while Section 3 explains the dataset used for the empirical work. Section 4 reports and 
discusses the findings, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Methodology 
Academic talent can be considered a specific type of human capital, in contrast to 
other  types of human capital such as athletic talent or entrepreneurship. Similar to all other 
types of human capital, academic talent cannot be directly measured. What can be measured 
is the academic performance of people. A university’s research and publication performance, 
and thus, ranking, reflects the size and quality of its stock of academic talent. Accordingly, a 
country’s performance in the university ranking tally is an indication of the country’s stock of 6 
 
this specific type of human capital. This study borrows from, and extends the methodology 
used in a niche Olympic Games literature, particularly Bernard and Busse (2004). This 
literature examines the socioeconomic determinants of countries’ performance in the 
Olympic Games medal tally; likewise, here we seek to identify the key socioeconomic 
determinants of countries’ performance in the university ranking tally. 
  In this paper, we focus on the ARWU league tables for reasons to be explained in the 
data section. The ARWU dataset provides the ranking of up to 500 universities in the world. 
This allows us to compute the number of top 500 universities that a country has in a 
particular year; we denote this variable by  500i TOP , where i indicates the country index. 
Later on, we also consider smaller subsets like top 300 and top 100 universities. The value of 
these variables for the vast majority of countries varies little over the six year period over 
which the ARWU league tables have been compiled: 2003-2008. The only notable exception 
is China whose share in the top 500 universities doubled during this period. The dataset is 
essentially cross-sectional rather than panel in nature. This does not necessarily cause any 
concerns because our primary interest is in identifying factors that explain the performance 
gap between countries, and therefore cross country analysis will suffice. The empirical work 
will focus only on the data for the latest year, 2008. We use the value of a single year rather 
than the sample average because, as explained below, in Poisson regressions the dependent 
variable must be an integer. 
A large number of countries do not have a single university breaking into the ranks of 
the top 500. However, these countries should also be included in the analysis to avoid 
selection bias. To accommodate for zero and non-negative observations, we consider two 
basic modelling options: the Tobit model and the Poisson model.  
The Tobit model is typically considered as a solution to modelling non-negative data 
samples containing a high proportion of zero observations. To motivate the use of the Tobit 7 
 
model, we follow Bernard and Busse (2004) and model  500i TOP  as a function of the size of 
the country’s academic talent stock,  i T , over some threshold level, 
* T , which in turn is a 
function of the world average level of academic talent stock.
 6 Since academic talent is not 
directly observable, it is a latent variable. The Tobit model is given by: 
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where  i y  is the observed value of  500i TOP  for a given year. 
To investigate what socioeconomic factors affect the accumulation of academic talent, 
it is further hypothesized that 
 
*2 ln( / ) ( ) , ~ (0, ) ii i i TT f ee i i d σ ′ =+ x β  ( 2 )  
where  i x  is a vector of independent, socioeconomic factors and β the corresponding 
unknown coefficients. Since the dependent variable is a measure of a country’s talent stock 
versus the world average, the dependent variables should also be measured relative to their 
world average values. Nevertheless, in the case of cross sectional analysis, the world average 
values of the independent variables can simply be absorbed into the constant term and 
thereby do not need to be accounted for explicitly. 
A merit of using the Tobit model is that it captures the non-negative nature of the data 
and confines the predicted values of the dependent variable to be non-negative, i.e.  ˆ 0 i y ≥ . 
This is, however, only one of the two restrictions, the other restriction being  ˆ 500 i i y = ∑ . In 
                                                 
6 Bernard and Busse’s specification of 
*
it M  in the Tobit model (equations 3 and 4 in their paper) is incorrect 
because by setting  ()
* ln / it it ji j M TT = ∑ , a log function of world medal share, 
*
it M  must always be non-
positive. Nevertheless, this does not affect their empirical analysis as one could alternatively set 
** ln( / ) it it M TT = , where 
* T represents some threshold level of athletic talent. In fact, this is exactly the 
specification used by Bernard and Busse in their working paper (2000). The use of panel data in their case, 
however, raises another issue in that 
* T could be time varying because if the Olympic Games becomes more 
competitive overtime, the athletic talent threshold to earn a medal will also increase. This is not an issue in the 
current paper because we are using a cross sectional dataset. 8 
 
OLS regressions, this restriction will be automatically satisfied because the expected value of 
the error term is assumed to be zero. However, in the case of Tobit regressions, even though 
the mean value of  i e  in equation (2) is assumed to be zero, the forecast errors of the zero 
observations are not constrained to sum to zero.
7 As a result, the second restriction will not be 
satisfied, except by coincidence. While it is possible to rescale the predicted values so that the 
predicted sum is the same as the actual sum, any over (under) prediction actually indicates 
that overall, the model overestimates (underestimates) the coefficients. Unless by mere 
coincidence the degrees of overestimation or underestimation for different coefficients are the 
same, one cannot recover the ‘true’ coefficient values by rescaling the coefficient estimates 
with the same factor. 
A potential solution to the above problem is to estimate the Tobit model using 
Bayesian estimation methods. Using Bayesian methods, we can make prior assumptions 
about the properties of the dependent variable and restrict the total sum of the predicted value 
to lie within a certain band around the actual sum. However, restricting the total sum to a 
narrow band would require simulation of an extremely large Markov chain. Furthermore, the 
Tobit model assumes that the latent variable has a continuous distribution. However, when 
the concerned variable is truly discrete, standard methods like maximum likelihood Tobit 
result in inconsistent parameter estimates (Mullahy 1986). Portney and Mullahy (1986) in 
their application conduct Tobit specification error tests of Nelson (1981) and Lin and 
Schmidt (1984) for their count measure and find considerable evidence of misspecification. 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982) in their study on the impact of governmental efforts to reduce 
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The two parts correspond to the classical regression for the nonlimit observations and the relevant probabilities 
for the limit observation, respectively. While the first order condition for the constant term forces the sum of the 
residual term to be zero in the case of classical linear regressions, this is not the case for the Tobit model due to 
the presence of the discrete term in the above log likelihood function. 
 9 
 
population growth and augment child survival and schooling in a developing country find 
that for their discrete fertility variable the estimated coefficient standard errors from the 
fertility equation to be biased. Hence, they unambiguously rule out the use of the Tobit model 
in their application. 
  An alternative to the Tobit model is the Poisson model. The Poisson distribution can 
be written as 
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  ( 500 ) var( ) (equidispersion) ii i ET O P Y λ = =  ( 4 )  
To ensure  i λ  to be non-negative, the most common specification for λ is an 
exponential function 
  exp( ) ii λ ′ = x β  ( 5 )  
where x is a vector of independent variables and β the corresponding unknown coefficients. 
Equations (4) and (5) together establish the Poisson regression model 
  ( 500 | ) exp( ) ii i i ET O P λ ′ = = xx β  ( 6 )  
The Poisson regression model has a number of merits: it captures the discrete and non-
negative nature of the data; it allows inference to be drawn on the probability of the event 
occurrence; it allows for straightforward treatment of zero observations; it naturally accounts 
for the heterokedastic and skewed distribution inherent to non-negative data (Winkelmann 
and Zimmermann 1995). In the current context, it has an additional merit that it guarantees 
the sum of the predicted values to be equal to the actual sum. Assuming independence among 
the count variables, the log-likelihood for the Poisson regression model follows as: 
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Equation (8) ensures that the sum of predicted values is the same as the actual sum if x 
contains a constant term.  
  A potential problem confronting the Poisson model is that in many applications, the 
assumption of “equidispersion” is violated. For instance, in our dataset the mean of  500i TOP  
is 5.33 and standard derivation 17.99 (see Table 2). This is referred as “overdispersion” in the 
literature,
8 and it could be eliminated to a certain extent by the inclusion of additional 
regressors. Alternatively, one can specify a distribution that permits more flexible modelling 
of the variance than the Poisson distribution.  The standard alternative distribution used is 
negative binomial (NEGBIN), with variance either assumed to be a linear or a quadratic 
function of the mean (Cameron and Trivedi 1986). A much simpler alternative is to use the 
Generalized Linear Model (GLM) under the assumption that the true variance is proportional 
to the distribution used to specify the log likelihood: 
 
2 var( 500 | ) var ( 500 | ) ii M L ii TOP TOP σ = xx  ( 9 )  
If there is overdispersion, one would expect 
2 1 σ > . 
 The  conventional  R-squared statistics based on a sum of squared residuals does not 
apply to either the Poisson or the Tobit model. Wooldridge (2009) suggests calculating the R-
squared as the squared correlation coefficient between  i y  and ˆi y , i.e.  ()
2 2 ˆ (,) ii Rc o r r y y = % , 
motivated by the fact that the usual R-squared for OLS regressions is equal to the squared 
correlation between  i y  and the OLS fitted values.  
                                                 
8 However, as it is shown later our sample actually passes the overdispersion test. 11 
 
Beside correlation, another, yet more direct, measure of goodness-of-fit is simply the 
extent to which the model can predict the actual value of the dependent variable for given 
values of the independent variables. Since the Poisson model already guarantees the sum of 
the predicted values to be equal to the actual sum, i.e.  ˆii yy = ∑ ∑ , we can use the sum of 
absolute forecast error as a ratio of the total actual value, i.e.  ˆ / ii i yy y − ∑ ∑  as a measure 
of goodness-of-fit. Yet, this measure is bounded from below at 0 but unbounded from above. 
In order to make the measure lie between 0 and 1 we propose to construct 
( )
2 ˆ / ii i i R yy y y =+ − ∑∑  as an alternative indicator of the goodness-of-fit. The value of 
2 R  increases as forecast errors reduce, with 1 indicating a perfect match for every single 
observation and 0 indicating at least one infinitely large forecast error. A value of 
2 R  equal 
to, say, 0.8 means that the average forecast error is approximately equal to 20 percent of the 
actual value. One should, however, remember that the Poisson and Tobit estimates are chosen 
to maximize the log-likelihood functions, not R-squared. As a result, unlike OLS regressions, 
adding more variables into the model does not necessarily improve 
2 R %  or 
2 R . 
 
3. Data 
There are numerous organizations publishing international university rankings, 
including Shanghai Jiaotong University’s Academic Ranking of World Universities 
(ARWU)
9, the Times Higher-Quacquarelli Symonds World University Rankings (THES-
QS)
10, the Webometrics Ranking of World Universities
11 and Newsweek magazine’s Top 500 
Global Universities
12. Amongst them the ARWU and THES-QS rankings are most well-
known and widely cited by academics and the media, e.g. The Economist (2005). A 
consensus is emerging in the literature that the ARWU, despite its limitations, provides a 
                                                 
9 http://www.arwu.org 
10 http://www.topuniversities.com 
11 http://www.webometrics.info/about.html  
12 http://web.archive.org/web/20060820193615/http://msnbc.msn.com/id/14321230/site/newsweek 12 
 
superior indicator of university excellence in terms of objectivity and comprehensiveness 
(Marginson, 2007; Taylor & Braddock, 2007; Hazelkorn, 2007; Buela-Casal et al. 2007). The 
ARWU aims to measure the institutions’ research strength using internationally comparable 
indicators such as number of alumni and staff winning Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals, 
publication count, as well as a per capita performance measure (Liu & Cheng 2005). On the 
contrary, the THES-QS ranking relies heavily on peer reviews, which are criticized for being 
strongly subjective and resulting in the high volatility of the rankings. Therefore, in this paper 
we focus only on the ranking statistics of ARWU. 
  For the independent variables, we examine a number of socioeconomic variables that 
potentially affect the accumulation of academic talent. Our benchmark model includes four 
independent variables: log population size (LPOP), log income (LGDPPC ), R&D spending 
as a percentage of GDP ( _ RD ), and a dummy for English as the native language (ENG ). If 
academic talent is randomly distributed around the world, then other things being equal, 
countries with a larger population should have a larger academic talent stock. However, 
academic talent, like athletic talent, can be a result of nurture as well as of nature; therefore, 
the amount of available resources matters. We use income as a general measure of the 
financial resources available in a country, and use total expenditure on R&D as a specific 
measure because if the total R&D expenditure of a country goes up, the amount going to the 
higher education sector is likely to go up accordingly. The English language dummy is to test 
if English speaking countries are in a privileged position. At first glance, the answer seems to 
be an obvious yes given that the rankings primarily consider publications in English. 
However, many academic staff in non-English speaking countries now teach and publish in 
English.
13 Moreover, universities in English speaking countries have the advantage of being 
                                                 
13 Japanese universities, for instance, offer many postgraduate programs to “international or internationally-
minded” students, and recruit international scholars without requiring the knowledge of Japanese language 
(Hazelkorn 2008). 13 
 
able to recruit both native and non-native English speaking academics from around the world, 
whereas universities in non-English speaking countries are more confined in their recruitment 
if their staff members are required to teach in the local language. In summary, positive signs 
are expected for all these four variables. 
  Besides these four variables, we also try to include a number of other socioeconomic 
variables for robustness tests. These include the number of migrants as a percentage of total 
population (MIG), public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP (EDUGDP), log 
public expenditure per tertiary student (LEXPTER), and the number of tertiary students as a 
percentage of population (TERPOP). The migration variable is to account for the fact that 
academics are highly mobile internationally. Public expenditure on education is yet another 
possible measure of resources. Different from the R&D expenditure, EDUGDP captures the 
resources flowing into all primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. The deployment of this 
variable can be motivated by the fact that, if a country’s primary and secondary education is 
sound, it can produce good prospective tertiary students and academics. In comparison, the 
expenditure per tertiary student specifically measures the resources put into the higher 
education sector. Lastly, the number of tertiary students as a proportion of the population size 
measures the size of the higher education sector; countries with a larger higher education 
sector obviously need to employ more academics. Therefore, all four additional variables are 
expected to have positive signs on their respective coefficients. These additional independent 
variables, however, are found to be statistically insignificant and are subsequently dropped. 
In the next section, we report and discuss only the results of the key variables.
14  
Table 1 lists all the variables used in this paper and their sources and Table 2 shows 
their summary statistics. To mitigate reverse causality, the time periods of the independent 
                                                 
14 The results of models with additional variables can be obtained from authors on request. 14 
 
variables are chosen to lag 2008 (we formally test for reverse causality later on). The data for 
individual countries are provided in Table A1. 
A few observations on the figures in Table 2 are worth commenting. First, the total 
sum of  500i TOP  is slightly less than 500 because some countries/regions that have top 500 
universities, like Taiwan, are excluded due to the lack of data for other variables. Second, 
besides 500i TOP , the table also shows the statistics of  300i TOP  and  100i TOP . In the case of 
300i TOP , the total sum is larger than 300 because some ranking positions are shared by more 
than one university. Third, there is a high degree of concentration of top universities amongst 
a small number of countries. For instance, only 40 percent of the sample countries (i.e. 38 out 
of 93) have one or more top 500 universities, and the percentage falls to 15 percent as it 
comes to the top 100 universities. In other words, over half the countries in the sample have a 
zero value for their dependent variables. Lastly, when the additional independent variables 
are added, the sample size reduces from 93 to 79. 
 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Results for TOP500 
We first report the Poisson model results for  500i TOP . The results for various model 
specifications are shown in Table 3. Models (a) and (b) show that either income or population 
size by itself does a very poor job in explaining  500i TOP ; but once the two are combined as 
a single measure of the total economic size in model (c), the explanatory power improves 
dramatically. Model (d) further shows that LGDPPC has twice the effect of LPOP, indicating 
that income has individual effects even after controlling for the total economic size. The 
variables have the expected signs in all three models. Model (e) shows that adding  _ RD  into 
the model only marginally improves its goodness-of-fit, and the variable is just significant at 
the 10 percent level with the expected sign. Model (f) further adds ENG as another control 15 
 
variable. It shows that the English language dummy has the expected sign and is significant at 
a level slightly higher than 5 percent. The inclusion of ENG also improves the significance of 
_ R D to the 1 percent level. Despite both ENG and  _ R D being highly significant 
individually, their inclusion does not add much to the overall explanatory power of the model 
as compared to the more parsimonious model (d). In what follows, we consider model (f) as 
the benchmark model. 
According to the benchmark model (f), other factors being equal, expanding the 
population size by one percent increases the number of top 500 universities in a country by 
0.77 percent, while a one-percent rise in the income level increases that figure by nearly 1.5 
percent. The model also shows that, other factors being equal, raising the expenditure of 
R&D by one percentage point of GDP increases the number of top 500 universities by 28 
percent. While the effect may appear to be very large, a one percentage point increase in 
R&D actually represents more than doubling the R&D spending for an average country in the 
sample (the mean value of R&D is equal to 0.89 percent of GDP). Lastly, it is shown that an 
English-speaking country has 41 percent
15 more top 500 universities than a non-English 
speaking, but otherwise identical country.  
  Figure 1 shows the actual values and the prediction errors (actual minus predicted 
value) of  500i TOP  for each of the 38 countries that have at least one top 500 university. The 
full results are shown in Table 4, which reports the predicted values of  500i TOP  for each of 
the 93 countries in the sample, the prediction errors (the actual minus the predicted value) and 
the prediction errors in proportional terms if the actual value is bigger than zero. Although the 
US is the frontrunner in the ARWU league table, it actually underperforms by nearly 18 
universities based on the benchmark model, followed by Japan (17 universities short). 
However, in proportional terms, Mexico is the most underperformed country with a shortfall 
                                                 
15 Since ENG is a dummy variable, the effect of a change of its value from 0 to 1 is computed as 
exp(0.344*1)/exp(0.344*0) – 1 = 0.41.  16 
 
of 332 percent, followed by Russia with a shortfall of 186 percent. For countries that have 
zero actual observations, Iran is predicted to have the largest number of top 500 universities 
of about 2, followed by Malaysia with a predicted number of 1.5 and Kuwait of 1.4. The 
results indicate that, given these countries’ human and non-human resources, they have the 
potential to perform better. This in turn suggests that there are some factors hindering them 
from fully realizing their potential, such as insufficient resources being channelled into the 
higher education sector (e.g. Mexico
16), institutional barriers to participating in international 
academic communities (e.g. Iran
17), or salary incentives being unconducive to publishing in 
high ranked international journals (e.g. Japan).  
On the other hand, the UK outperforms the model prediction by 15 universities, or 36 
percent in percentage terms. The next best ‘outperformer’ is a rising economic and political 
power—China, which has 13 universities, or 70 percent, more than the model’s prediction. 
For countries with non-zero top 500 universities, China has the best outperformance in 
proportional terms. The third best outperformer in absolute terms is Germany, which has 
about 10 more universities than the model’s prediction.
18 
Despite the aforementioned theoretical limitations of the Tobit model, it is useful to 
examine their empirical significance. The results for the Tobit model based on the benchmark 
model are also reported in Table 5 along with  the Poisson model results for the ease of 
comparison. It can be seen that the signs for all variables remain correct in the Tobit 
regression. In terms of goodness-of-fit, both 
2 R % and 
2 R  statistics indicate that the Poisson 
model provides a better fit for the data than the Tobit model. In fact, the total predicted 
                                                 
16 The higher education system in Mexico has undergone a long process of transition, which is regarded as “not 
necessarily positive” , and a range of problems have been identified, such as insufficient enrolment levels, poor 
staff salary, demoralized faculty, and non-existing student financial aid (Ordorika 1996). 
17 There are unverified claims that Iranian scholars and universities sometimes experience formal and informal 
barriers to international collaboration, such as being denied visa to attend academic conferences overseas 
(Pankratz 2008). 
18 Interestingly, the German government, after acknowledging the country has lost the glory of being one of the 
world’s intellectual centres, has put forward a policy of creating a German Ivy League (Vogel 2006). 17 
 
number of  500i TOP  by the Tobit model is equal to 663.4, which is 33 percent more than the 
actual sum of 496! More importantly, the fact that the Tobit model over predicts  500i TOP  
implies that overall it overestimates the coefficients of the independent variables. An 
explanation for this result is that there is a high level of heteroskedasticity in the data set, as 
commonly seen in cross sectional data. In OLS regressions, heteroskedasticity affects the 
standard errors, but the estimates for the coefficients remain unbiased. However, in the case 
of the Tobit model, this will lead to biased estimates of the coefficients.
19 The Poisson model, 
on the contrary, automatically accounts for heteroskedasticity (see equation (5)). 
4.2 Robustness Tests 
The US dominates the ARWU league table with a total of 159 top 500 universities, 
equivalent to 31.8 percent. The UK is the next most prominent country on the league table, 
with a total of 42 top 500 universities, equivalent to 8.4 percent. Together they account for 40 
percent of the top 500 universities. Therefore, it is important to test the robustness of the 
results with respect to the exclusion of these two ‘outliers’. The results are also shown in 
Table 5. The exclusion of the US and the UK  has a very small effect on the coefficient 
values and virtually no impacts on their significance or signs for most variables. The only 
exception is that the significance of the English language dummy  becomes significant at the l 
percent level and the magnitude of its coefficient also  increases. Therefore, we can conclude 
that, the model for  500i TOP  is very robust to the exclusion of the top two performers. 
A key distinction between the model for the university ranking and that for the 
Olympics Games is that the chance of having reverse causality onto income is higher for the 
former than for the latter. This is because academic talent is more likely to have bigger 
impacts on the macroeconomy than athletic talent due to the spillover effects of knowledge 
creation. Besides income, the expenditure on R&D may also incur endogeneity problems in 
                                                 
19 See David Madigan’s note on Logistic and Tobit Regression, available at 
http://stat.rutgers.edu/~madigan/COLUMBIA/ 18 
 
that top universities are more attractive to research funding. In testing endogeniety in the 
Poisson model we follow the procedure described by Wooldridge (2002), which requires 
instrumental variables for the potentially endogenous variables. One obvious choice of 
instrument for a potentially endogenous variable is its lagged value. Due to data limitation, 
we use the 1980 values of  i LGDPPC  and the 1996 values of  _ i R D  as their respective 
instruments. We first estimate the following reduced form OLS regressions: 
  1 2 1980, ii i LGDPPC c c LGDPPC u = ++   ( 1 0 )  
and 
  3 4 1996, __ ii i R Dcc R D v = ++  ( 1 1 )  
Once we obtain the residuals  ˆi u  and  ˆi v ,  we estimate the Poisson regression model by 
regressing the count data on the explanatory variables and the residuals. The Wald test that 
the coefficients of the residuals are zero, cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level, 
indicating that there is insufficient evidence to support the claim that income and R&D 
expenditure are endogenous in the benchmark model. There are a number of possible 
explanations for the absence of evidence of reverse causality from  500i TOP  to income. 
Firstly, 500i TOP  only captures a specific type of human capital within the total human 
capital stock of a country; secondly, the research output used in determining the ARWU 
rankings is mostly academic research instead of commercial research; thirdly, the 
materialization of academic research in terms of commercialization or policy making may 
take years; and lastly, the benefit of academic research outcome often spills over to other 
countries, diluting the effect of difference in league table performance on income difference. 
Likewise, the lack of evidence of reserve causality from  500i TOP  to R&D spending may be 
due to the fact that the effect of  500i TOP  on university R&D spending may be too small to 
be discernible in the much bigger pool of national R&D spending. 19 
 
Lastly, recall that when there is overdispersion, a negative binomial (NEGBIN) 
distribution is more appropriate than the Poisson distribution. We employ the procedure 
suggested by Wooldridge (2002) to test for overdispersion and to estimate the overdispersion 
parameter α for the Poisson model. The test suggests that when there is an overdispersion the 
variance is greater than the mean, i.e.var( ) (1 ) ii i y μ αμ = + , where exp( ) ii X μ β = . The null 
hypothesis ( 0 α = ) that there is no overdispersion cannot be rejected at the 5 percent 
significance level, indicating that the Poisson model restriction that the mean is equal to the 
variance holds well. 
4.3 Results for TOP300 and TOP100 
Besides top 500 universities, we also consider countries’ performance in more elite 
subgroups, top 300 and top 100 universities. The dependent variables are denoted 
respectively as  300i TOP  and  100i TOP . These results are reported in Table 6 while the results 
for  500i TOP  are also repeated in the table for the ease of comparison. 
  The signs of all variables remain the same across all three models. The goodness-of-
fit of the three models is also very similar, indicating that the benchmark model maintains its 
explanatory power for all three dependent variables. Nonetheless, there are gradual changes 
of the magnitude of the coefficients. Specifically, the coefficient of population size reduces as 
it moves toward the more elite group (from 0.77 for  500i TOP  to 0.67 for  100i TOP ). On the 
contrary, the coefficients of income, R&D expenditure, and English language all go up. The 
coefficient of income increases by 50 percent (from 1.50 to 2.27), while those of R&D 
expenditure and the English dummy increase by around three fold (from 0.28 to 0.81 for 
_ R D and from 0.34 to 1.09 for ENG). It can be inferred from these results that, the more 
elite the academic talent, the more important the nurturing factors and the less random their 
distribution across countries. The results are somewhat expected in that, as the old saying 20 
 
goes: “genius is ten percent inspiration and ninety percent perspiration”; at the same time 
perspiration requires sufficient resources and a good working environment, and their 
distributions across countries are far from being random. Moreover, there is a strong 
tendency for the most talented academics to move to places where they can be best supported 
and most easily find their peers. Together these factors indicate that there is an agglomeration 
effect of academic talent clustering in countries with better resources and working 
environment. 
Figure 2 shows the actual values and the prediction errors of  100i TOP  for each of the 
15 countries that have at least one top 100 universities. The US continues to underperform, 
but the margin shrinks from the 10 percent in the case of  500i TOP  to 4.3 for the more elite 
top one hundred group. The margin of over performance for the UK also shrinks from 57 
percent to 17.6 percent. The results are probably related to the fact that resources are, 
expectedly, not uniformly distributed across universities. Inequality in resources within the 
top 100 universities is likely to be smaller than within the top 500 universities. Therefore, 
aggregate measures of national resources will be a better proxy of the resources available to a 
smaller and more homogenous group of universities than those available to a larger, more 
diversified one. 
  For the most elite universities, the dominance of the US and the UK is even more 
striking. The two countries have 114 and 33 top 300 universities (38 percent and 11 percent), 
and 54 and 11 top 100 universities (54 percent and 11 percent) respectively. Once again we 
examine how robust the results for the most elite group of universities are by excluding these 
two top performing countries. Due to space limitations, we only report the results for 
100i TOP . When the US is excluded from the sample, there is an increase in the coefficients 
of all the independent variables; when the UK is also excluded, the coefficient of population 
size returns to close to the value of the full sample. Also, when both countries are excluded, 21 
 
the coefficient of the English language dummy drops to less than the original value in the full 
sample, and its significance level also drops down to the 10 percent level. Therefore, we 
conclude that while overall the model remains robust with respect to the exclusion of the US 
and the UK, expectedly it is somewhat more sensitive for  100i TOP  than for  500i TOP . 
5. Discussions and Conclusions 
This paper aims to seek a better understanding of the socioeconomic determinants of 
countries’ performance in university league tables. It focuses on the most widely cited 
university league table—Shanghai Jiaotong University’s Academic Ranking of World 
Universities (ARWU). The ARWU league table, like other league tables, is dominated by a 
single country—the US. Sixty percent of the countries in the sample, on the contrary, do not 
have a single university successfully breaking into the top 500 rank. The analysis in the paper 
helps shed light on the large performance gap between countries in the league tables. 
The empirical methodology needs to satisfy two restrictions: firstly, the predicted 
number of top universities for any country should be non-negative; secondly, the total 
predicted number of top universities should be identical to the actual total number. Standard 
Tobit regressions satisfy the first restriction but not the second, while standard OLS 
regressions satisfy the second but not the first one. Poisson regressions satisfy both 
restrictions and thereby are applied to identify the key socioeconomic determinants of the 
number of top 500 universities that countries had in 2008. 
  We find that a large proportion of cross countries difference in the ARWU league 
tables can be readily explained by a few variables, primarily population size and income, with 
the addition of R&D expenditure and an English language dummy. The findings confirm that 
resources, including R&D funding, are crucial in building an internationally competitive 
higher education sector. The model is robust to a number of specifications tests and exclusion 22 
 
of the top two performers, the US and the UK. It is also robust to the modelling of top 100 or 
top 300 universities. 
Despite the observation that the US monopolizes the world’s top universities, our 
finding indicates that there is nothing extraordinary about its performance. According to our 
model, the reason for the US’s dominance is due to its large population and economic size, 
further enhanced by its large expenditure on R&D (2.7 percent of GDP compared to the 
sample mean of 0.89 percent) and its predominant language being English. In fact, given the 
resources it has, the US is underperforming by about 4 to 10 percent based on the model 
prediction. This finding does not necessarily come as a surprise in that on a very broad sense, 
the similarities of university systems across countries are probably bigger than their 
differences. This finding may nevertheless make sobering reading for administrators and 
policymakers who fix their eyes firmly on US universities in searching for a better model for 
their institutions.  
On the other hand, one needs to be cautious in inferring from the findings, the relative 
merits of the US university model. Despite the fact that the US’s performance falls short of 
the model prediction, we must emphasise that it is still the frontrunner by a large margin. 
Furthermore, the finding only indicates that down to top 100 universities, there is no 
discernible country specific effect in the US to be explained. It does not exclude the 
possibility that what distinguishes the US system from the others lies in the very top end of 
the league tables, say, the top 50 or top 20 universities, where the dominance of the US is 
strongest.  Additionally, many academics in other countries were educated in US universities 
(and the other way round as well), and therefore their success could be attributed at least 
partly to the US model. 
Another inference one might be tempted to draw from the findings is that, the US’s 
current hegemonic position in the league tables could be challenged if its economic power 23 
 
weakens. This is particularly relevant in the context that the US’s economic hegemony is 
increasingly being tested by fast growing economies in Asia and Latin America, especially 
the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries. However, such a scenario of declining 
US dominance in the league tables, while possible, is not necessarily warranted. For a given 
total amount of resources provided for the higher education sector, how the resources are 
distributed amongst universities can also make a significant difference to the overall national 
outcome. Therefore, one must be careful in making predictions of a country’s future 
performance simply based on a linear projection of its macroeconomic indicators. 
The distributional factor may also explain why China is the best outperformer in the 
top 500 league table in proportional terms. Although China is only a lower-middle income 
country, its sheer size allows it to mobilize more resources than its income level suggests, and 
focus them on a small number of universities. According to recent estimates (Li 2004), 
approximately US$2.2 billion was distributed to a selected number of universities during the 
period between 1996 and 2000. One of the programs launched by the Chinese government, 
Project 985, was indeed designed to meet the policy objective that “China must have a 
number of first-rate universities of international advanced level”. 
The strong effect of English language on countries’ performance suggests that 
universities in non-English speaking countries need concerted efforts in disseminating their 
research output in English medium in order to improve their rankings. Endeavour in this 
direction has already been observed in Europe and increasingly in Latin America and Asia, 
implying that the ‘natural’ advantage of English-speaking countries will be gradually eroded 
over time.  
We conclude this paper by briefly discussing its limitations and providing pointers for 
future research opportunities. In focusing on socioeconomic factors, the analysis in this paper 24 
 
is silent on the importance of institutional factors,
20 such as student and staff numbers, the 
size of endowment, incentive structure, and the status of a public/private university. The last 
factor is of particular interest as it could have implications in policy debates, as to what extent 
the higher education sector, which is largely a semi public sector in most countries, should be 
allowed to be privatized. The importance of these factors may vary across different countries, 
and how institutional factors may interact with national factors would also be worth 
investigating. An analysis at the institutional level thereby will constitute a natural 
progression of this line of research. 
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Table 1 Definitions and sources of variables. 
Variable Definition  Year  Source  Expected 
sign 
Note 
500 TOP   The number of top 500 universities 
in ARWU. 
2008  ARWU    The dependent variable; similar definitions for 
300 TOP  and  100 TOP  
LPOP  Log total population  1999-2004 
Average 
WDI  +  To measure the size effect 
LGDPPC   Log GDP per capita, (PPP, constant 
2000 international dollar) 
1999-2004 
Average 
WDI  +  To measure the general resource effect 
_ R D  Research and development 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
1999-2004 
Average 
WDI  +  To measure the specific resource effect 
ENG  Dummy, = 1 if English is the first 
language or widely used, = 0 
otherwise 
 CIA  World 
Factbook 
+  To measure if being an English speaking country has 
advantage 




WDI  +  To measure how open the labour market is (it is 
assumed that academic labour market is of similar 
degree of openness as the national labour market) 




WDI  +  To measure the overall quality of the education system 
LEXPTER   Log public expenditure per tertiary 




WDI  +  To measure the quality of the higher education sector 











Table 2 Summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
 
  TOP500 TOP300 TOP100  LPOP LGDPPC  R_D  ENG  MIG  EDUGDP  LEXPTER TERPOP 
  Mean  5.33 3.24 1.08  16.21  9.09 0.89 0.25 8.09 4.80 8.16 2.95 
  Median  0  0  0  16.14  9.15 0.58  0  3.39 4.71 8.30 3.13 
  Maximum  159  114  54  20.97 11.07  4.42  1  64.11 11.03 10.82  6.34 
  Minimum  0  0  0  11.67  6.34 0.01  0  0.04 0.82 5.17 0.08 
  Std.  Dev.  17.99  12.70  5.76 1.79 1.16 0.95 0.43  11.42  1.61 1.16 1.46 
  Skewness  7.03 7.46 8.54 -0.05  -0.47 1.58 1.17 2.91 0.60 -0.37  -0.14 
  Kurtosis  58.89  64.00  78.42  3.24 2.31 5.06 2.37  12.69  4.82 2.87 2.37 
  Sum  496  301  100  1507.23  844.92  82.69  23  639.17 378.82 645.00 232.85 
No.  of  Obs.  93 93 93 93 93 93 93 79 79 79 79 







Table 3 Estimation results of the Poisson model for TOP500 
































LPOP + LGDPPC 
(=LGDP) 
   1.071*** 
(0.064) 














0.430 0.469 0.635 0.767 0.768 0.768 
2 ~
R   0.096 0.109 0.892 0.966 0.957 0.965 
No.  obs.  93 93 93 93 93 93 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are Huber/White standard errors. 
 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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(if actual > 0) 
Argentina 1  1.74  -0.74  -0.74 
Armenia 0  0.04  -0.04   
Australia 15  11.15  3.85  0.26 
Austria 7  5.23  1.77  0.25 
Azerbaijan 0  0.09  -0.09   
Belarus 0  0.36  -0.36   
Belgium 7  5.47  1.53  0.22 
Bolivia 0  0.12  -0.12   
Brazil 6  4.88  1.12  0.19 
Brunei Darussalam  0 0.47 -0.47
Bulgaria 0  0.37  -0.37   
Cambodia 0 0.03 -0.03
Canada 21  20.41  0.59  0.03 
Chile 2  1.10  0.90  0.45 
China 18  5.35  12.65  0.70 
Colombia 0  0.75  -0.75   
Costa Rica  0  0.24  -0.24   
Croatia 0  0.52  -0.52   
Cyprus 0  0.30  -0.30   
Czech Republic  1  1.94  -0.94  -0.94 
Denmark 4  4.09  -0.09  -0.02 
Ecuador 0  0.32  -0.32   
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0  0.75  -0.75   
Estonia 0 0.22 -0.22
Finland 6  4.21  1.79  0.30 
France 23 21.21 1.79 0.08
Georgia 0  0.05  -0.05   
Germany 40  29.89  10.11  0.25 
Greece 2  2.96  -0.96  -0.48 
Hong Kong, China  5  3.78  1.22  0.24 
Hungary 2  1.33  0.67  0.34 
Iceland 0  0.46  -0.46   
India 2  2.79  -0.79  -0.40 
Indonesia 0  0.93  -0.93   
Iran, Islamic Rep.  0  2.15  -2.15   
Ireland 3 3.45 -0.45 -0.15
Israel 6  4.61  1.39  0.23 
Italy 22 13.87 8.13 0.37
Jamaica 0  0.13  -0.13   
Japan 31  47.64  -16.64  -0.54 
Jordan 0  0.09  -0.09   
Kazakhstan 0  0.44  -0.44   
Korea, Rep.  8  9.87  -1.87  -0.23 
Kuwait 0  1.41  -1.41   
Kyrgyz Republic  0  0.02  -0.02   
Latvia 0  0.21  -0.21   
Lesotho 0  0.01  -0.01   
Lithuania 0  0.35  -0.35   
Luxembourg 0  1.38  -1.38   
Macao, China  0 0.23 -0.2332 
 
Madagascar 0  0.03  -0.03   
Malaysia 0  1.45  -1.45   
Malta 0  0.22  -0.22   
Mauritius 0  0.15  -0.15   
Mexico 1  4.32  -3.32  -3.32 
Mongolia 0  0.02  -0.02   
Morocco 0  0.28  -0.28   
Mozambique 0  0.01  -0.01   
Myanmar 0  0.04  -0.04   
Netherlands 12  8.51  3.49  0.29 
New Zealand  5  1.94  3.06  0.61 
Nicaragua 0  0.03  -0.03   
Norway 4  4.75  -0.75  -0.19 
Pakistan 0  0.58  -0.58   
Panama 0  0.20  -0.20   
Paraguay 0  0.09  -0.09   
Peru 0  0.55  -0.55   
Philippines 0  0.58  -0.58   
Poland 2  2.54  -0.54  -0.27 
Portugal 2  2.07  -0.07  -0.03 
Romania 0  0.80  -0.80   
Russian Federation  2  5.72  -3.72  -1.86 
Singapore 2  5.42  -3.42  -1.71 
Slovak Republic  0  0.68  -0.68   
Slovenia 1  0.74  0.26  0.26 
South Africa  3  2.20  0.80  0.27 
Spain 9  9.25  -0.25  -0.03 
St. Lucia  0  0.03  -0.03   
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  0  0.01  -0.01   
Sudan 0  0.13  -0.13   
Sweden 11  8.02  2.98  0.27 
Switzerland 8  6.28  1.72  0.22 
Tajikistan 0  0.02  -0.02   
Thailand 0  1.19  -1.19   
Trinidad and Tobago  0  0.29  -0.29   
Tunisia 0  0.29  -0.29   
Turkey 1  2.54  -1.54  -1.54 
Uganda 0  0.04  -0.04   
Ukraine 0  0.73  -0.73   
Uruguay 0  0.21  -0.21   
Zambia 0  0.03  -0.03   
United Kingdom  42  26.76  15.24  0.36 
United States  159  176.87  -17.87  -0.11 
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Table 5 Estimation results of Tobit and Poisson models for TOP500 
  Tobit Model (f)  Poisson Model (f)  Model (f)  
without US 
Model (f)  















































0.602 0.768 0.726 0.730 
2 ~
R   0.743 0.965 0.839 0.843 
No.  obs.  93 93 92 91 
 
Same as Table 2. 
 
 
Table 6 Estimation results for TOP100 and TOP300 






Model (f) TOP100 
without US 
Model (f) TOPp100 

























































0.768 0.738  0.753  0.753  0.761 
2 ~
R   0.965 0.957  0.976  0.976  0.976 
No. obs.  93  93  93  92  91 
 
Same as Table 2. 
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Table A1 Data for 93 countries 
Country  Top500 Top300 Top100  LPOP  LGDPPC  R_D  ENG  MIG  EDUGDP LEXPTER TERPOP 
Argentina  1 1 0  17.44  9.18 0.43 0 4.09 4.21 7.25 5.13 
Armenia  0 0 0  14.93  7.94 0.23 0 9.47 3.22 6.91 2.29 
Australia  15 9  3 16.79  10.30 1.66 1 20.91 4.68  8.85  4.76 
Austria  7  2  0 15.90  10.40 2.07 0 12.59 5.70  9.63  3.04 
Azerbaijan  0 0 0  15.91  7.97 0.33 0 2.04 3.55 6.06 1.45 
Belarus  0 0 0  16.11  8.77 0.69 0  12.64  5.87 7.47 4.53 
Belgium  7 6 0  16.15  10.32  1.95 0 8.06 6.05 9.32 3.54 
Bolivia  0 0 0  15.96  8.18 0.29 0 1.14 5.93 7.34 3.54 
Brazil  6 2 0  19.00  8.99 0.91 0 0.38 3.91 8.24 1.89 
Brunei  Darussalam  0  0  0 12.75  10.78 0.02 0 31.82 5.27  NA  1.25 
Bulgaria  0 0 0  15.89  8.93 0.51 0 1.28 3.45 7.35 3.07 
Cambodia  0 0 0  16.39  7.01 0.05 0 1.95 1.60 6.18 0.25 
Canada  21  18 4 17.26  10.40 1.98 1 18.31 5.46  9.66  4.02 
Chile  2 0 0  16.57  9.29 0.60 0 1.23 3.94 7.51 3.27 
China  18  6 0  20.97  8.02 1.01 0 0.04 1.91 7.92 0.79 
Colombia  0 0 0  17.57  8.60 0.18 0 0.28 4.71 7.52 2.29 
Costa  Rica  0 0 0  15.21  9.02 0.36 0 8.60 4.83 8.29 1.90 
Croatia  0 0 0  15.31  9.33 1.12 0  14.04  4.48 8.39 2.38 
Cyprus  0  0  0 13.47  10.06 0.29 0 12.67 6.01  9.34  2.01 
Czech  Republic  1 1 0  16.14  9.77 1.21 0 4.42 4.21 8.62 2.66 
Denmark  4 3 2  15.49  10.37  2.43 0 6.14 8.33  10.00  3.69 
Ecuador  0 0 0  16.34  8.67 0.06 0 0.83 1.37 NA  NA 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  0 0 0  18.04  8.36 0.19 0 0.25 4.81 NA 3.44 
Estonia  0 0 0  14.12  9.43 0.73 0  17.25  5.63 8.02 4.29 
Finland  6 1 1  15.46  10.24  3.34 0 2.71 6.28 9.28 5.41 
France  23  14 3 17.90  10.29 2.17 0 10.65 5.71  9.11  3.46 
Georgia  0 0 0  15.35  7.88 0.24 0 4.52 2.28 NA 3.12 
Germany  40  24 6 18.23  10.30 2.47 0 12.04 4.57  NA  NA 
Greece  2 1 0  16.21  10.15  0.50 0 7.32 3.85 8.80 4.52 
Hong  Kong,  China  5  3  0 15.72  10.32 0.58 1 41.57 4.21  9.92  2.17 
Hungary  2 0 0  16.14  9.59 0.86 0 2.97 5.16 8.42 3.42 
Iceland  0 0 0  12.56  10.35  2.75 0 6.22 6.99 9.14 3.96 36 
 
India  2 0 0  20.76  7.51 0.73 1 0.59 4.08 7.20 1.01 
Indonesia  0 0 0  19.16  7.95 0.06 0 0.13 2.77 NA 1.54 
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  0 0 0  18.00  9.01 0.59 0 3.39 4.66 7.88 2.42 
Ireland  3  1  0 15.18  10.43 1.16 1 11.30 4.36  9.12  4.37 
Israel  6 4 1  15.69  9.99 4.42 0  36.64  7.21 8.77 4.30 
Italy  22 7  0 17.86  10.23 1.08 0 3.30  4.66  8.85  3.24 
Jamaica  0 0 0  14.77  8.64 0.06 1 0.70 5.40 8.16 1.62 
Japan  31  12 4 18.66  10.27 3.12 0 1.37  3.66  8.56  3.13 
Jordan  0 0 0  15.42  8.24 0.34 0  40.70  4.94 NA 3.46 
Kazakhstan  0 0 0  16.52  8.77 0.22 0  18.46  3.09 6.32 3.27 
Korea,  Rep.  8 3 0  17.67  9.83 2.54 0 1.19 4.31 7.29 6.34 
Kuwait  0  0  0 14.65  10.52 0.17 0 64.11 6.30 10.82 1.54 
Kyrgyz  Republic  0 0 0  15.42  7.36 0.19 0 6.98 3.67 5.75 3.67 
Latvia  0 0 0  14.67  9.19 0.40 0  21.79  5.45 7.55 4.50 
Lesotho  0 0 0  14.47  7.11 0.05 1 0.29  11.03  9.26 0.26 
Lithuania  0 0 0  15.06  9.28 0.64 0 5.69 5.53 7.97 4.15 
Luxembourg  0  0  0 13.00  11.07 1.66 0 37.08 3.35  NA  0.63 
Macao,  China  0  0  0 13.02  10.15 0.07 0 54.46 3.21  9.22  3.67 
Madagascar  0 0 0  16.64  6.72 0.20 1 0.37 2.95 7.37 0.20 
Malaysia  0 0 0  16.99  9.26 0.59 0 6.10 7.01 9.18 2.54 
Malta  0 0 0  12.89  9.90 0.35 1 2.35 4.78 9.06 1.84 
Mauritius  0 0 0  14.00  9.10 0.36 1 1.42 4.01 8.32 1.04 
Mexico  1 1 0  18.42  9.29 0.42 0 0.58 5.15 8.46 2.10 
Mongolia  0 0 0  14.71  7.68 0.25 0 0.35 7.04 6.48 3.55 
Morocco  0 0 0  17.18  8.07 0.60 0 0.42 6.32 8.07 1.06 
Mozambique  0 0 0  16.75  6.34 0.50 0 2.00 3.33 8.01 0.08 
Myanmar  0 0 0  17.66  6.65 0.10 0 0.25 0.82 5.39 1.08 
Netherlands  12 9  2 16.59  10.42 1.81 0 9.88  4.90  9.51  3.16 
New  Zealand  5  2  0 15.19  10.05 1.11 1 17.50 6.73  9.06  4.82 
Nicaragua  0 0 0  15.47  7.63 0.05 0 0.53 3.55 NA 1.91 
Norway  4 2 1  15.33  10.71  1.64 0 6.89 7.27 9.94 4.39 
Pakistan  0 0 0  18.78  7.58 0.16 1 2.78 2.10 NA 0.29 
Panama  0 0 0  14.93  9.04 0.33 0 3.00 4.48 7.86 3.96 
Paraguay  0 0 0  15.52  8.23 0.09 0 3.15 4.83 7.28 2.06 
Peru  0 0 0  17.08  8.65 0.11 0 0.17 2.98 6.74 3.20 37 
 
Philippines  0 0 0  18.18  7.90 0.14 1 0.43 3.16 5.93 3.02 
Poland  2 0 0  17.46  9.39 0.60 0 2.05 5.20 7.77 4.65 
Portugal  2 0 0  16.15  9.89 0.76 0 6.52 5.47 8.56 3.73 
Romania  0 0 0  16.91  8.94 0.39 0 0.60 3.32 7.60 2.51 
Russian  Federation  2 1 1  18.79  9.15 1.15 0 8.22 3.42 6.98 5.79 
Singapore  2  1  0 15.23  10.54 2.07 1 36.45 3.67  NA  NA 
Slovak  Republic  0 0 0  15.50  9.51 0.60 0 2.23 4.15 8.33 2.72 
Slovenia  1 0 0  14.50  9.92 1.45 0 8.65 6.01 8.61 4.68 
South  Africa  3 1 0  17.62  8.95 0.80 1 2.33 5.42 8.30 1.51 
Spain  9 3 0  17.53  10.15  0.96 0 6.14 4.28 8.61 4.44 
St.  Lucia  0 0 0  11.97  8.98 0.41 1 4.90 6.67 NA 1.34 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines  0 0 0  11.67  8.63 0.10 1 7.16 9.55 NA  NA 
Sudan  0 0 0  17.35  7.29 0.41 1 2.31 NA  NA 0.61 
Sweden  11 9  4 16.00  10.29 3.88 0 11.55 7.39  9.58  4.24 
Switzerland  8  7  3 15.80  10.44 2.75 0 21.92 5.66  9.91  2.36 
Tajikistan  0 0 0  15.65  7.05 0.07 0 5.15 2.46 5.17 1.39 
Thailand  0 0 0  17.93  8.71 0.26 0 1.47 4.92 7.51 3.37 
Trinidad  and  Tobago 0 0 0  14.08  9.53 0.12 1 3.08 3.97 9.66 0.83 
Tunisia  0 0 0  16.09  8.65 0.63 0 0.39 6.99 8.35 2.27 
Turkey  1 0 0  18.05  9.08 0.66 0 1.86 3.74 8.31 2.47 
Uganda  0 0 0  17.07  6.66 0.32 1 2.04 3.85 7.29 0.25 
Ukraine  0 0 0  17.70  8.36 1.02 0  14.24  4.80 7.36 4.27 
Uruguay  0 0 0  15.01  9.04 0.25 0 2.64 2.68 7.42 2.97 
Zambia  0 0 0  16.19  6.98 0.01 1 3.11 2.18 7.50 0.23 
United  Kingdom  42 33 11 17.90 10.28  1.82  1  8.36  5.02  8.95  3.64 
United  States  159  114  54  19.47  10.58  2.68 1  12.51  5.60 9.26 5.23 
 
 